핵심 요약
국가의 해외자산 운용이 위기 방어에서 수익 추구로 넓어지면서 달러 노출의 형태와 위험 구성이 달라진다는 분석이다.
논증 분석
논리구조
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한국의 외환보유액 정체와 국민연금 해외자산 증가를 출발점으로, 중앙은행 외 다른 공공 투자자의 중요성이 커졌다고 설명한다.
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연금·국부펀드·국유은행은 중앙은행보다 위험을 감수하므로 수익률뿐 아니라 자산가치 변동·유동성 위험도 커진다.
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달러의 외환보유액 비중 하락과 공공 투자자의 달러 자산 보유는 양립한다. 외환보유액 구성만으로 탈달러화를 판단하지 말라는 논지다.
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미 국채에서 기업 주식으로의 수요 이동이 정부·기업 자금조달 조건을 다르게 만들 수 있다고 보고, 한국의 반도체 경기와 미국 AI 주식의 동반 위험을 경고한다.
결론
국가·기관별 자산 정의와 조사 기간이 서로 다르며 중앙은행 준비자산과 주식은 유동성·위험이 다르다. 일본 GPIF의 2014년 금액이 원문에 $400m으로 적혀 있다. 이를 $400bn으로 고치거나 성장 배수를 계산하지 않았고 해당 비교는 정량 통계에서 제외했다. 금리·자본비용의 변화 원인과 크기는 이 자료로 식별할 수 없다.
토론 질문
해외 주식 투자가 국내 산업 위험을 실제로 분산하는지 어떻게 확인할까? 국가 전체 포트폴리오에서 유동성 준비금과 장기 투자 자산의 역할을 어떻게 나눌까?
원문
When countries switch towards riskier assets, the global economy feels the consequences
Illustration: Álvaro Bernis
AFTER THE pain of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 most of South Korea’s foreign assets were deployed for one purpose—to defend the won. By 2016 the central bank had gathered a pile of dollars, euros, other currencies and gold worth $400bn. These net reserves, which could likewise be sold to prop up the local currency, made up roughly 80% of the country’s total foreign assets. Financial policymaking was laser-focused on the next crisis.
The crisis never came, and foreign assets kept mounting—but for different reasons. Although South Korean foreign-exchange reserves are unchanged from a decade ago, the central bank has been overtaken by the National Pension Service (NPS), a government-owned nest egg, as the country’s biggest international investor. NPS owns some $650bn-worth of foreign assets, up from $80bn in 2012.
South Korea is one of several countries where foreign reserves are no longer the government’s only big source of financial firepower. Others include Japan, China and Saudi Arabia. In the past decade their governments have accumulated foreign assets in the portfolios of public pension systems, sovereign-wealth funds and state-owned banks. Some, like Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF), have attracted attention owing to flashy stakes in skyscrapers and sports tournaments. But their rise also has less visible implications for the financial system, because the new players take more risks than central bankers, hoping for better returns. This exposes governments’ large stockpiles to volatility.
Like South Korea, most countries used to hoard foreign reserves defensively: they might need them to prop up the exchange rate in a crisis. Then, in economies with trade surpluses, policymakers found themselves selling the local currency to prevent its immediate appreciation, which could hurt exports. The result was a mounting pile of foreign assets, so large that it would never need to be liquidated all at once.
As such, they did not need all to be cashlike instruments or gold. Reserve managers could chase not just peace of mind but also returns, by buying riskier securities. Research published in June by Antonin Chenard, Barry Eichengreen, Eric Monnet and Florian Morvillier, four economists, assessed 109 central banks from 1950 to 2022. They found that at the end of that period almost two-thirds of their reserves were held in securities on average, up from one-third around 2000.
This suited policymakers fine. Income from foreign assets is handy while oil wells are depleted, populations age and demands on government spending rise. But returns were still limited because even the most audacious reserve manager would probably not stray beyond investment-grade credit.
Other types of sovereign investors, though, have had no such qualms. State-run banks happily make risky loans. Pension funds dabble in junk bonds. National rainy-day funds buy shares and even take over companies. Between 2014 and 2025, foreign assets held by pension and sovereign-wealth funds in China, Japan, Saudi Arabia and South Korea rose by at least $3.5trn. In the same period the world’s total central-bank reserves grew by less than half as much, having ballooned from $2trn in 2001 to $11.6trn in 2014.
According to research by Brad Setser of the Council for Foreign Relations, a think-tank, in the past decade or so seven of China’s biggest banks, all state-owned, have acquired foreign assets faster than the People’s Bank of China. Their holdings amount to $3.5trn, roughly the same as the PB o C ’s foreign reserves. Japan’s foreign reserves have hovered around $1trn for the past decade, but the foreign holdings of the Government Pension Investment Fund has risen from $400m in 2014 to $1trn in 2026. And Saudi Arabia’s PIF boasts overseas holdings with a value close to that of the central bank’s foreign reserves.
One result of the rise of alternative foreign assets concerns the countries that sell them, mainly America. Economists who argue that the dollar’s days as the global reserve currency are numbered point to its dwindling share of the world’s foreign-exchange reserves. This peaked at 71% in 2001 and has since fallen to 57%—lower than the greenback’s share of foreign-exchange transactions. Add governments’ other dollar assets, though, and the dollar continues to look formidable. Mr Setser estimates that nearly all the new funds and banks are more exposed to America than their countries’ central banks are. Some 80% of PIF ’s foreign portfolio and 70% of holding of China’s top five banks, for instance, are parked in dollar assets.
What has changed is the part of America’s economy that benefits from foreigners’ interest. Reserve managers liked America chiefly for its ultra-safe government bonds. Profit-seeking funds and banks are drawn to the vast profits of American firms, particularly in technology. In the 12 months to July, demand for Treasuries softened but foreigners bought a record value of American equities and fund units. In South Korea NPS owns shares in Apple and Microsoft. This raises the cost of capital for America’s government and reduces it for its companies.
Reserve judgment
The other consequence concerns the assets’ holders. The new bets promise newly juicy returns but bring new exposures. Old-fashioned reserve assets are liquid, stable and mildly countercyclical: the dollar typically rallies in global downturns. Stocks, startups and skyscrapers do not. So care must be taken to ensure that new-look foreign portfolios are not too correlated with the domestic economy. South Korea has every right to hold more foreign assets. But since its economic fate is already bound up with the AI boom through its chipmaking champions, it may want to steer clear of American AI stocks. ■
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