China isn’t using its considerable leverage over them—yet
Illustration: Cornelia Li
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O ne of the first things that impressed Richard Nixon on his historic trip to Beijing in 1972 was the honour guard of tall soldiers. “Each man turned his head slowly as I passed, creating an almost hypnotic sense of movement in the massed ranks,” he later recalled. It was a projection of power and co-ordination—one that remains identical for visiting foreign leaders today, though the soldiers are now even taller and include women in their ranks. Recent months have been especially busy for China’s honour guard.
Since December’s start, Emmanuel Macron, Mark Carney, Sir Keir Starmer and at least five other foreign leaders have trooped to Beijing. This month Friedrich Merz, Germany’s chancellor, will follow. Most remarkable about this parade of leaders is not their quantity but their identity. China, a diplomatic omnivore, rolls out the red carpet for the head of any country, no matter how big or small, rich or poor. But six recent visitors—from France, Canada, Britain, Finland, South Korea and Germany—share one crucial trait: they all lead formal allies of America.
The significance scarcely needs spelling out. In a world roiled by Donald Trump, America’s partners are tending to other relationships, including with China, America’s chief rival. To them this looks like eminently sensible diversification. From Beijing’s vantage it is a bigger breakthrough. For most of the past decade discussions from Seoul to Ottawa were about decoupling or, at least, de-risking from China. Now this drive is losing momentum. Chinese officials are “jubilant”, says a Western executive who recently met several of them.
Inevitably, this re-engagement has caused a backlash. Leaders have returned home from Beijing to critics who say their visits yielded precious few gains, while only deepening reliance on China. Nevertheless, for all the accusations of capitulation, the actual substance of the various bilateral meetings has been thin.
Consider the trade deal between Canada and China—one that Mr Trump warns will destroy Canada. The main Canadian concession was a sharp reduction in tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. But a quota will strictly limit the number of Chinese cars at the lower rate. Britain’s big “kowtow”, as opponents there call it, was to allow China to build a giant new embassy. But British security services are sanguine about the threat. As for European countries, they are standing firm, more or less. China had floated the idea of resuming negotiations on a trade deal. Instead, as one Chinese adviser puts it, China is getting nowhere with the European Commission and not much further with national governments.
It is also striking how the bonhomie in Beijing can swiftly revert to sniping. A few days after returning from China, Mr Macron warned that, if China fails to rein in its huge trade surplus, the European Union might hit it with fresh tariffs. There has also been some discord between Britain and China. Barely a week after Sir Keir’s visit, China sentenced Jimmy Lai, a British-Hong Kong business tycoon, to 20 years in jail for his pro-democracy activities. Britain, in turn, created an easier pathway to visas for thousands in Hong Kong, which Chinese officials called “despicable”.
Meanwhile, diplomats who attended leaders’ meetings in Bei-jing say that China has emphasised what it brands as Japan’s return to the “evil path of militarism”. But that message is falling flat—not only in Western capitals but also in Asian countries that suffered under Japan during the second world war. Days after visiting Beijing, South Korea’s President Lee Jae Myung was jamming on the drums with the woman who is currently China’s public enemy number one: Takaichi Sanae, Japan’s prime minister.
If China has a strong geopolitical hand to play now, why is it not demanding more concessions from visiting leaders? In part it is because symbolism is enough. The bilateral visits send a powerful message, at home and abroad, about China’s great-power status and America’s diminished reliability. Just stabilising relations with countries that previously hoped to cut out Chinese products from supply chains is also a material improvement. It affords China space and time to develop its technological capabilities, which will give it more leverage in the future. At the same time China’s world-class green-tech companies, among others, hope to build assembly sites in the West as a hedge against tariff wars. Many Chinese thinkers are also almost touching in their faith that China, if patient, will eventually persuade the rest of the world that, unlike America, it offers them stability and prosperity.
Yet consider how long China’s relative restraint will last. Chinese leaders are now well aware of their tremendous economic clout; they forced Mr Trump to back down from his most extreme trade-war tactics. They know, too, how to make life difficult for smaller countries that misbehave.
The coming turn
Some Chinese voices, especially at the hawkish end of the spectrum, suggest China should be pushing harder for what it wants. A recent editorial by China’s ambassador to Australia has caught the attention of diplomats in Beijing. He warned that it was “unacceptable” to seek benefits from China while disregarding its core interests. Read literally, this sounds like a new kind of threat, telling foreign leaders to support China’s position on unification with Taiwan or face economic consequences.
It is, in other words, possible to imagine a more assertive turn in how China uses its trading leverage. So far the government in Beijing has mainly punished countries that have stepped out of line and offended it. In the future it may set out to change their policies. That would be a risky move by China, since overt coercion could backfire by pushing targeted countries together. For now, thankfully, China is satisfied with the “hypnotic sense of movement” created by the stream of visitors to its capital. ■
논증 분석
유형: causal
핵심 주장
Donald Trump의 미국에 불안감을 느낀 미국의 동맹국들이 Xi Jinping의 Beijing으로 몰려들고 있으나, China는 현재 보유한 막대한 레버리지를 아직 본격적으로 활용하지 않고 있다.
논리구조
- 전제: 2025년 12월 이후 Emmanuel Macron, Mark Carney, Keir Starmer, Friedrich Merz 등 최소 6명의 미국 공식 동맹국 지도자들이 Beijing을 방문했으며, 이는 이례적인 현상이다.
- 진단: Donald Trump 집권 이후 미국의 신뢰성이 약화되면서, 미국의 동맹국들이 China와의 관계를 ‘분산 투자(diversification)’ 차원에서 재정립하려 하고 있다.
- 진단: China 입장에서 이 흐름은 단순한 외교적 교류를 넘어 더 큰 돌파구로, 수년간 지속되던 de-risking·decoupling 기조가 약화되고 있음을 의미하며 중국 관리들은 ‘환희(jubilant)’ 상태다.
- 반론: 각국 지도자들이 귀국 후 실질적 성과 없이 China 의존도만 심화시켰다는 비판에 직면했으나, 실제 합의 내용은 매우 빈약하다. Canada의 전기차 관세 인하에는 쿼터가 붙었고, Britain의 대형 중국 대사관 허가는 안보 당국이 위협으로 보지 않으며, European Commission과의 무역협정 협상도 진전이 없다.
- 논거: Beijing에서의 우호적 분위기는 곧바로 마찰로 전환되기도 한다. Macron은 귀국 직후 China의 무역 흑자 시정 실패 시 European Union의 추가 관세를 경고했고, China는 Jimmy Lai에게 20년 형을 선고해 Britain과 갈등을 빚었으며, South Korea 대통령 Lee Jae Myung은 Beijing 방문 직후 China의 공공의 적 Takaichi Sanae 일본 총리와 교류했다.
- 진단: China가 강력한 지정학적 패를 쥐고도 더 많은 양보를 요구하지 않는 이유는, 상징성만으로도 미국의 신뢰성 약화와 China의 강대국 지위를 국내외에 과시할 수 있고, 탈중국 공급망 재편 흐름을 늦추는 것 자체가 실질적 이득이며, 기술 역량 발전을 위한 시간과 공간을 확보하기 때문이다.
- 논거: China의 친환경 기술 기업들은 관세 전쟁에 대비해 서방 국가 내 조립 공장 설립을 추진하고 있으며, 중국 전략가들은 인내심을 갖고 기다리면 결국 China가 안정과 번영을 제공하는 국가로 세계를 설득할 수 있다는 믿음을 갖고 있다.
- 논거: China는 자국의 막대한 경제적 영향력을 인지하고 있으며, 실제로 Donald Trump를 극단적 무역전쟁 전술에서 후퇴시킨 바 있다. China 주재 호주 대사의 최근 논평은 핵심 이익(Taiwan 통일 등)을 무시하면 경제적 결과를 감수해야 한다는 새로운 위협의 신호탄으로 해석될 수 있다.
- 반론: China가 더 공세적으로 레버리지를 활용하는 방향으로 전환할 경우, 노골적 강압이 오히려 표적 국가들을 결속시키는 역효과를 낳을 수 있다.
결론
China는 현재 미국 동맹국들의 방문이 주는 상징적 효과에 만족하며 레버리지 행사를 자제하고 있지만, 향후 단순한 보복을 넘어 타국의 정책 변화를 강제하는 더 공세적 전략으로 전환할 가능성이 있다.
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