Hosting back-to-back visits by Putin and Trump, China shows its power
Photograph: Reuters
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F or Xi Jinping, a leader who aspires to place China at the centre of world affairs, it was a triumphant week of diplomacy. Just four days after Donald Trump concluded a visit to Beijing, looking for business deals and help with Iran, Vladimir Putin turned up, seeking assistance for his war in Ukraine. Russia’s president, like America’s, lavished praise on his host and left with a clutch of agreements. But like Mr Trump’s, the deals were short on detail. And the enduring image at home and abroad was one of China as the fulcrum of global geopolitics, dealing with America as an equal and Russia as a junior partner.
China had not originally planned for the visits to be so close: Mr Trump’s was scheduled for early April but delayed by the war in the Gulf. Still, the timing worked well for Mr Xi. It sent a clear message that better relations between China and America will not come at the expense of his “no limits” partnership with Mr Putin. At the same time, Mr Xi showed the leverage that he has gained over Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Despite talk of shared interests, Mr Putin ended his two-day visit on May 20th without a long-discussed deal on the building of another gas pipeline between Russia and China.
Mr Putin’s visit was not as elaborate as Mr Trump’s. China greeted the Kremlin’s leader in the same way, with a military honour guard, a 21-gun salute and cheering children. Mr Xi and Mr Putin then held formal talks, followed by another meeting over tea, in the Great Hall of the People. But there was no equivalent of Mr Trump’s private tours of the Temple of Heaven and Zhongnanhai, the leadership compound. And Mr Putin and Mr Xi did not attempt any of the more personal displays of camaraderie that they have staged before, such as swigging vodka, making pancakes or watching a hockey game.
Instead they emphasised the breadth of their relationship and their shared opposition to many aspects of American policy. In a lengthy joint statement, they condemned American and Israeli attacks on Iran, as well as the abduction of heads of state (a clear reference to Venezuela’s). They expressed opposition to sanctions on North Korea and to external interference in Latin America and the Caribbean. They criticised Mr Trump’s “Golden Dome” missile-defence project as well as America’s “irresponsible” nuclear policy. And they renewed calls for a multipolar world order, warning of a drift towards the “law of the jungle”. As Mr Xi put it, in a thinly veiled reference to America: “The tide of unilateral hegemony is running rampant.”
In his public remarks, China’s leader put particular emphasis on the Middle East. He called for a “complete cessation of hostilities” there, warning that it would be “unacceptable” to resume fighting. That was sharper language than he used during Mr Trump’s visit. The Trump administration has been considering the possibility of resuming strikes on Iran, which have been suspended since a ceasefire was announced in mid-April.
Russian officials emphasised the 40 or so agreements that were signed during the summit, covering areas ranging from artificial intelligence and border infrastructure to co-operation in space and the protection of tigers and leopards. Mr Putin highlighted energy ties, noting that Russia was one of China’s biggest suppliers of oil and gas and that nearly all their trade was done in roubles or yuan, protecting it from “external influence” (that is, American sanctions). He invited Mr Xi, whom he called a “dear friend”, to visit Russia in 2027.
Yet there were few details of how the agreements would be implemented. And there was no mention in them, or in the two leaders’ public remarks, of Power of Siberia 2—a 1,600-mile (2,600-km) pipeline that would carry up to 50bn cubic metres of gas annually from eastern Russia to northern China via Mongolia. Russia is keen to make progress on the project to secure a new market for gas it can no longer sell to Europe. But China has been driving a hard bargain on price, volumes and other terms. It has also been reluctant to rely on any single supplier for more than about 20% of its hydrocarbon imports, a level it has already reached with Russia.
Russian officials had hoped that China would show more flexibility since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz highlighted the vulnerability of its seaborne imports of energy. About 90% of China’s oil imports still come by sea, largely from the Middle East, despite its efforts to diversify supplies and build pipelines across its borders. China and Russia seemed to make progress on the project when Mr Putin visited Beijing in September. Alexey Miller, the boss of Russia’s state-run gas company, Gazprom, announced afterwards that they had signed a legally binding memorandum. China also committed to “advancing preliminary work” on the project in its latest five-year plan, unveiled in March.
In the end, though, Mr Xi appears to have stood firm on his demands for better terms. That underlined how Russia, once China’s patron, has become dependent on Chinese economic support as well as dual-use technology for the war in Ukraine. “It’s a pretty solid display of how much leverage China has,” says Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre, a think-tank in Berlin. “Putin comes out not really empty-handed—everything that’s working is working—but there is no additional mileage that China is willing to go to support him, unless it’s really very beneficial for the Chinese.” Mr Gabuev also said that the back-to-back summits played well for Mr Xi by suggesting that he has better relations with both Mr Putin and Mr Trump than they have with each other.
Other deals between China and Russia may not have been made public. One of Mr Putin’s priorities was likely to have been securing access to more dual-use items, including drone components. Mr Xi, meanwhile, had been expected to seek more Russian help in developing China’s military capabilities, especially in undersea warfare, and in accessing data and tactical insights from the front lines in Ukraine. The two leaders’ statement did not mention such matters, saying only that the two countries would deepen defence co-operation, expand joint military exercises and patrols, and “work together to address various risks and challenges”.
Further details may emerge in the days following the summit, just as they have trickled out since Mr Trump left Beijing. For the moment, however, Mr Xi must be celebrating a diplomatic double-bill that brought him closer than ever to the Sino-centric world he craves. ■
논증 분석
유형: causal
핵심 주장
Xi Jinping은 Donald Trump와 Vladimir Putin의 연속 방중을 통해 중국이 미국과는 대등하게, 러시아와는 우월한 위치에서 교류하는 세계 외교의 중심임을 과시했다.
논리구조
- 전제: Xi Jinping은 중국을 세계 외교의 중심에 놓으려 하며, Donald Trump 방중 4일 후 Vladimir Putin이 방중함으로써 중국이 글로벌 지정학의 ‘축(fulcrum)‘임을 보여주었다.
- 논거: 연속 방중은 원래 계획된 것이 아니었으나, 그 타이밍은 Xi Jinping에게 유리하게 작용했다. 미-중 관계 개선이 Putin과의 ‘무한한 파트너십’을 훼손하지 않음을 동시에 시사했다.
- 논거: Putin의 방문은 Trump의 방문보다 격식이 낮았으며, 과거와 같은 개인적 우정 과시(보드카, 팬케이크, 하키 관람 등)도 없었다. 이는 양국 관계의 위계 변화를 상징한다.
- 논거: Putin과 Xi Jinping은 미국 패권 비판, 대이란·이스라엘 공격 규탄, 다극 세계 질서 촉구 등 반미 공동 입장을 강조하는 장문의 공동성명을 발표했다.
- 진단: 40여 개의 협정이 서명되었으나, Power of Siberia 2 파이프라인 협상은 타결되지 않았다. China는 가격·물량·조건 등에서 강경한 협상 입장을 유지했으며, 러시아산 에너지 수입 비중 20% 상한선을 지키려 했다.
- 진단: 러시아는 Hormuz Strait 봉쇄로 인한 중국의 해상 에너지 수입 취약성을 활용해 China의 유연성을 기대했으나, Xi Jinping은 자국에 더 유리한 조건을 고집하며 양보하지 않았다.
- 논거: Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre의 Alexander Gabuev에 따르면, 이번 방문은 중국이 Putin에 대해 보유한 레버리지를 명확히 보여주며, 중국이 매우 유리하지 않은 한 추가 지원에 나서지 않음을 시사한다.
- 반론: 드론 부품 등 이중용도 품목 접근이나 중국의 군사력 강화 협력 등 공개되지 않은 합의가 존재할 가능성도 있다. 세부 사항은 정상회담 이후 서서히 공개될 수 있다.
- 결론: 이번 외교 연속 이벤트는 Xi Jinping이 Putin과 Trump 양측 모두와 더 좋은 관계를 유지하면서 중국 중심의 세계 질서를 향해 한층 더 가까이 다가갔음을 보여준다.
결론
Putin의 방중은 Trump 방중과 함께 중국을 미국과 러시아 모두를 다루는 글로벌 외교의 중심으로 부각시켰으며, Xi Jinping은 러시아에 대한 경제적 레버리지를 확보한 채 자국 이익 중심의 협상력을 입증했다.
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