Both have much to gain from being less belligerent
Illustration: Beatrice Caciotti
Aminister in Turkey has spoken of one day “ruling” Jerusalem. Israeli officials have warned darkly that Turkey is “the new Iran”. Listen to the volleys of invective flying in both directions, and you might think that two of the Middle East’s pivotal powers are heading for conflict.
The tension is real. Turkey, a mostly Muslim country, fumes over Israel’s ill-treatment of Palestinians. Israel accuses Turkey of harbouring leaders of Hamas, the Islamist group that attacked Israel on October 7th 2023. Each thinks the other threatens its borders. Israel has fostered ties with Kurds, including some that Turkey’s government, ever wary of Kurdish nationalism, sees as enemies. Turkey has close relations with the ex-jihadists now ruling Syria, who appear to be reformed but who Israel fears could one day prove hostile to the Jewish state.
Israel’s prime minister and Turkey’s president often swap ferocious insults. Binyamin Netanyahu recently called Recep Tayyip Erdogan an “antisemitic dictator” who is “committing genocide against the Kurds”. Then again, Mr Erdogan has likened the Israeli leader to Hitler, saying Israel is a chaos factory fuelled “by blood and tears”.
Such rhetoric gets attention abroad, but it is mostly intended for domestic ears. Mr Netanyahu faces a tough election in the autumn, and fears that he will lose office having been cast as the man who failed his people on October 7th. Mr Erdogan may lean on Turkey’s parliament to call an election next year. Each loves to pose as a doughty defender of the nation against external threats. Each is thus a handy foil for the other.
It does not have to be this way. Both countries are allies of America, which is, belatedly, trying to discourage the verbal salvoes. Not long ago, the armed forces of Israel and Turkey were able to co-operate. In the recent past it was possible to imagine healthy economic ties, too. Their respective industrial and technological strengths and physical proximity should have made that straightforward. Given the right politics, how might a better relationship be fostered again?
Energy may be the key, despite an embargo Mr Erdogan’s government imposed on trade with Israel in 2024. Much of the oil Israel imports is pumped in Azerbaijan or the Kurdish region of Iraq, and then transported by pipeline through Turkey or shipped through Ceyhan, a Turkish port.
More should follow. Given Iran’s ability to disrupt the flow of hydrocarbons through the Strait of Hormuz, other countries should develop alternative sources and supply routes. One rich possibility is gas in the eastern Mediterranean. Exploration there by Israel is already advanced. It should be open to joint projects with Turkey and other littoral states to develop subsea gasfields and export the energy they find there.
When Israel and Turkey worked together more closely, plans were drawn up for a pipeline to connect the eastern Mediterranean gasfields to Turkey’s southern ports. A related project would be to forge a regional network of pipelines to bring oil and gas from afar more easily to market. Israel and Turkey should both aspire to be a part of this network linking Gulf producers and others to buyers in Europe and Asia.
It is still not clear when, or even if, the Strait of Hormuz will be fully reopened to tanker traffic, at least without users paying fees to Iran (and perhaps Oman). If Israel and Turkey want to reduce their vulnerability to the regional rogue, and maybe make a large heap of money in the process, they should trade fewer barbs and more barrels. ■
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논증 분석
유형: prescription
핵심 주장
Turkey와 Israel의 극렬한 언어 충돌은 실질적 전략 이해의 충돌이 아니라 Recep Tayyip Erdogan과 Binyamin Netanyahu 양쪽의 국내 선거 계산에서 비롯된 것이며, 동지중해 가스 개발을 중심으로 한 에너지 협력이 양국 관계 정상화의 현실적 경로다.
논리구조
- 진단 — 적대의 수사적 과잉: Recep Tayyip Erdogan은 Binyamin Netanyahu를 히틀러에 비유하고, 이스라엘 관리들은 Turkey를 ‘새로운 Iran’으로 규정하는 등 언어 전쟁이 실제 군사 충돌 위험보다 훨씬 앞서 있다.
- 진단 — 실질적 갈등 요인: Hamas 지도부 은신처 문제, 쿠르드 민족주의를 둘러싼 갈등, Syria 신정권에 대한 상반된 시각 등 구체적 마찰 요인이 존재하지만, 이것이 본질적 적대를 의미하지는 않는다.
- 논거 — 국내 정치 동학: Binyamin Netanyahu는 2026년 가을 총선을 앞두고 10·7 사태 책임론에서 벗어나야 하고, Recep Tayyip Erdogan은 2027년 선거를 앞두고 있어 양국 지도자 모두 상대방을 ‘외부 위협’의 표적으로 활용하는 유인이 크다.
- 논거 — 협력의 역사적 전례: 과거 양국 군대는 실질적으로 협력했고, 경제적으로도 산업·기술 보완성과 지리적 근접성이 건전한 관계를 자연스럽게 뒷받침할 수 있는 조건이었다.
- 처방 — 에너지를 접점으로: Strait of Hormuz를 통한 석유 흐름이 Iran에 의해 언제든 차단될 수 있는 상황에서, 아제르바이잔·이라크 쿠르드산 원유가 이미 터키 영토와 Ceyhan 항을 통해 이스라엘로 공급되고 있다는 기존 경제적 상호의존을 확장해야 한다.
- 처방 — 동지중해 가스 파이프라인: 이스라엘 해저 가스전과 터키 남부 항구를 연결하는 파이프라인 계획이 이미 수립된 바 있으며, 이를 실현하면 양국 모두 Iran 리스크 감소와 유럽·아시아 수출 수익이라는 이중 이익을 얻는다.
- 결론적 처방: 양국이 설전 대신 에너지 협력을 선택할 경우 전략적 취약성 감소와 경제적 이득을 동시에 달성할 수 있으며, America의 중재 의지도 이를 뒷받침하고 있다.
결론
Turkey와 Israel의 적대는 구조적 필연이 아니라 정치적 선택이며, 동지중해 에너지 협력망 구축은 양국 지도자가 국내 정치적 부담 없이 관계를 복원할 수 있는 가장 현실적인 출구를 제공한다.