That means spending big, but wisely, on satellites, intelligence networks and the like, write Nico Lange and Fabrice Pothier
Illustration: Dan Williams
Listen to this story
Your browser does not support the <audio> element.
E urope is running out of time. With the talks in Abu Dhabi between America, Russia and Ukraine taking place with minimal European input, the clock is ticking. During the first year of Donald Trump’s second term, European governments were trying to buy time to build out their own defences. The latest crisis over Greenland has changed that calculus dramatically.
America’s retreat from and hostility to the transatlantic security architecture mean the ground is shifting faster than European governments can adapt. They have helped Ukraine survive. Survival, however, is different from security. If the continent wants lasting stability in the decade ahead, it must confront an uncomfortable reality: Europe remains heavily dependent on America for the systems that make modern warfare work.
Europe has manpower, armour, aircraft and, increasingly, political will. What it lacks are the “strategic enablers” that bind these assets into a credible fighting force: satellites, intelligence networks, electronic warfare and long-range strike capabilities. These crucial elements remain overwhelmingly American.
This dependence matters now. European nato members are finally spending serious money on defence. But if new funds simply reinforce existing nato plans built on an American backbone, Europe will remain a security consumer rather than a provider.
That is why the surge in defence spending must be used largely to build a European backbone of strategic enablers, drawing on European technology, industry and co-ordination. Supporting Ukraine and building these capabilities are not competing objectives. They are the same project. The systems Europe needs for its own defence are those Ukraine needs to survive.
Consider space. Modern warfare depends on satellites for imagery, secure communications, navigation and early warning. America operates roughly 250 dedicated military satellites. Europe has around 50, many designed for narrow national missions rather than a shared purpose.
Satellites are the operating system of modern defence. They enable three essentials: seeing, connecting and timing. Ukraine’s experience underlines this. Without Western satellite support—mostly American—Ukraine would struggle to track Russian forces, co-ordinate units or defend its airspace. Europe faces the same constraint. Without sovereign space assets, it cannot act independently in a crisis.
Europe’s commercial space sector is thriving. But unless defence budgets are used to create a shared European space architecture, Europe will continue to operate with limited awareness and borrowed resilience. Providing Ukraine with European satellite data and communications should serve as a proving ground for systems Europe itself must ultimately rely on.
If space provides the strategic overview, isr (for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) delivers operational clarity. Satellites show what is happening; isr explains what it means. This includes drones, signal-intercept aircraft and electronic sensors. Increasingly, it also includes civilian infrastructure—from highway cameras to acoustic sensors—capable of detecting sabotage, troop movements or drone incursions. Open-source intelligence, from social media to ship-tracking data, now complements these tools by allowing real-time verification.
Electronic warfare (EW) adds another critical layer, and one Europe lacks at scale. It allows forces to jam communications, disrupt drones and protect their own systems from interference. In Ukraine it has become decisive.
Europe is not short of ideas. Across the continent, startups are developing sophisticated ew systems, from anti-drone jammers to mobile electronic-attack platforms. The weakness lies in integration. Defence ministries struggle to identify viable technologies, and procurement systems move too slowly to adopt them. Deploying these tools in Ukraine offers the fastest way to test, refine and scale them—while building Europe’s own ew ecosystem.
Debates about Europe’s security often focus on long-range missiles. Existing systems are highly capable, but mostly American and made in small numbers—and at great cost. Modern warfare, as Ukraine shows daily, is a contest of endurance. It requires strike systems that are accurate, cheap and simple enough to produce in huge quantities. Ukraine has improvised such capabilities with low-cost drones and missiles that reach behind enemy lines.
Europe has the industrial base to do the same. Carmakers, robotics firms and advanced manufacturers already produce high-precision components at scale and low cost. They know how to manufacture millions of units reliably—something traditional defence contractors find it hard to do. Linking these industries with Europe’s defence startups and missile designers could yield long-range strike systems in the quantities modern conflict demands.
Helping Ukraine develop and field these systems would accelerate learning, enable industrialisation and reduce Europe’s reliance on American cruise missiles and bombers. This agenda presents an opportunity. Europe has the money, the tech and the industrial capacity. What it lacks is urgency and co-ordination.
A Europe with its own space backbone, its own intelligence and EW capabilities and its own mass-produced long-range strike systems would shape events rather than just respond to them. It would be a stronger partner for America—not a dependent one—and better placed to deter threats before they reach its borders.
Helping Ukraine and strengthening Europe are the same task. Europe has shown solidarity. Now it needs to show spine. ■
논증 분석
유형: prescription
핵심 주장
유럽이 진정한 안보 주체가 되려면 방위비 증액을 단순히 기존 NATO 체계 강화에 쓸 것이 아니라, 위성·정보·전자전·장거리 타격 등 현대전을 가능케 하는 ‘전략적 핵심 역량’을 유럽 자체적으로 구축하는 데 집중 투자해야 한다.
논리구조
- 전제: Abu Dhabi 협상에서 유럽의 발언권이 극히 제한적이고, Donald Trump 2기 행정부의 대서양 안보 체계 이탈·적대화로 인해 유럽이 적응할 시간이 빠르게 소진되고 있다.
- 진단: 유럽은 병력·기갑·항공력과 정치적 의지를 보유하고 있으나, 이를 실질적인 전투력으로 묶어주는 ‘전략적 핵심 역량’—위성, 정보 네트워크, 전자전(EW), 장거리 타격—은 압도적으로 미국에 의존하고 있다.
- 진단: 유럽 NATO 회원국들이 방위비를 늘리고 있지만, 이 자금이 미국 중심의 기존 NATO 계획을 강화하는 데 쓰인다면 유럽은 안보 소비자 지위에서 벗어날 수 없다.
- 논거: 우주(Space): 현대전은 위성에 의존하며, 미국이 군사 위성 약 250기를 운용하는 반면 유럽은 약 50기에 불과하고 대부분 좁은 국가 목적용으로 설계되어 있어, 독자적 위기 대응 능력이 없다.
- 논거: ISR(정보·감시·정찰): 위성이 전략적 조망을 제공한다면, 드론·신호 감청기·전자 센서·민간 인프라·오픈소스 정보를 활용한 ISR이 작전적 판단력을 제공하며, 이 역량의 유럽 자체 구축이 필수적이다.
- 논거: 전자전(EW): 우크라이나에서 통신 교란·드론 무력화 등 전자전이 결정적 역할을 하고 있으나, 유럽은 관련 스타트업의 아이디어는 풍부하지만 조달 시스템이 느리고 통합이 부재하여 실전 배치가 어렵다.
- 논거: 장거리 타격: 현대전은 지속전 양상으로 정밀하고 저렴하며 대량생산 가능한 타격 체계가 요구되며, 유럽의 자동차·로봇·첨단제조 산업을 방위 스타트업·미사일 설계사와 연계하면 이를 실현할 수 있다.
- 처방: 방위비 증액분을 유럽 기술·산업·조정을 기반으로 한 전략적 핵심 역량 구축에 우선 투입하고, 우크라이나 지원을 이 역량의 실전 검증·산업화 가속의 장으로 활용해야 한다.
- 반론: 우크라이나 지원과 유럽 자체 역량 구축이 경쟁 목표라는 시각이 있으나, 저자들은 두 과제가 동일한 프로젝트이며 유럽이 자국 방어에 필요한 체계가 곧 우크라이나가 생존에 필요한 체계라고 반박한다.
- 결론: 자체 우주 기반, 정보·EW 역량, 대량생산 장거리 타격 체계를 갖춘 유럽은 사건을 주도하고, 미국의 의존국이 아닌 대등한 파트너가 되어 위협을 국경 밖에서 억제할 수 있다.
결론
유럽이 진정한 안보 제공자가 되려면 연대(solidarity)를 넘어 전략적 척추(spine)—독자적 위성·ISR·전자전·장거리 타격 역량—를 구축해야 하며, 이는 우크라이나 지원과 동일한 과제다.
Nico Lange is the founder of IRIS and a former German defence chief of staff. Fabrice Pothier is the chief executive of Rasmussen Global and a former NATO head of policy and planning.