It is risky to let Ukraine into the EU. It’s more dangerous to keep it out
Illustration: Alex Nabaum
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D O EUROPEAN LEADERS think their countries might soon be at war? Their words say yes. In Cyprus for a European Union summit on April 23rd and 24th, Poland’s prime minister, Donald Tusk, voiced fears that Russia could attack Europe’s eastern flank within “months”. Given doubts about America’s commitment to its transatlantic allies, Europe must get serious and strengthen its common defences within NATO and the EU, he declared.
The actions of other European leaders are more ambivalent. The contradictions are especially glaring when it comes to their relations with Ukraine. EU governments this month approved a €90bn ($105bn) loan for Ukraine that had been blocked by a spoiler in their midst: the populist-right, Putin-friendly government of Viktor Orban in Hungary. Unfortunately for Ukraine, Mr Orban’s ejection by voters in mid-April has made other leaders’ doubts more visible, now they can no longer hide behind Hungary’s veto. Many EU member countries, including the power-duo of France and Germany, are in no hurry to grant Ukraine the full membership that it seeks, let alone on the accelerated timeline demanded by the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, who wants his country to join by January 2027. Friedrich Merz, the German chancellor, has publicly ruled out swift accession, stating that Ukraine cannot join the bloc while at war and must meet strict standards on the rule of law, corruption and other fundamental principles.
Some concerns are understandable. For all its heroism, Ukraine is a corrupt, fragile democracy that is liable to emerge from this conflict with ambiguous borders and Russia as its neighbour-from-hell. Other Euro-worries are more feeble. For instance, EU farmers are scared of competition from Ukraine’s large, world-class farming industry. If the country ever does join, it is said in Brussels, the Common Agricultural Policy could not survive in its current, subsidy-heavy form.
Against such doubts Ukraine’s backers make a stark counter-argument. Any credible defence of Europe must involve Ukraine’s 800,000 men at arms, and its home-grown, AI -guided drone and counter-drone technologies that have turned front lines into buzzing, futuristic death-zones for Russian invaders. The tide has turned, was the response of President Alexander Stubb of Finland, when asked recently about security guarantees for Ukraine. “We Europeans have to understand we need Ukraine more than Ukraine needs us,” he counselled.
Ukraine long pinned its hopes on NATO membership, and on mutual-defence pledges in Article 5 of that alliance’s treaty. Alas for Ukraine, its NATO ambitions are “dead” for the foreseeable future, say Western officials. As president, Joe Biden was sceptical about the country joining NATO. Its hopes were killed by President Donald Trump’s hostility to the idea and indeed to Ukraine.
That leaves EU accession as the remaining way for Ukraine to anchor itself in Europe and the wider democratic world. With a full welcome years away, France and Germany are pushing associate forms of membership for Ukraine, possibly involving observers’ seats in EU institutions and councils, without voting rights. Perhaps most important, there is talk of extending to Ukraine the bloc’s own mutual-defence clause, buried in Article 42.7 of the EU treaties, as part of a provisional set-up.
The Cyprus summit saw EU officials given the task of exploring how Article 42.7 might work in a conflict. According to Germany’s chancellor, the assembled leaders also broadly endorsed the notion of provisional membership for Ukraine, understanding that Europe cannot safely close its door to that country. Ukrainian voters may one day have to endorse a peace treaty that involves giving up territory, Mr Merz went on. To win such a referendum, Mr Zelensky would need to be given a pathway that ultimately leads to “full membership of the European Union”.
At this point, European and Ukrainian citizens can be forgiven some confusion about the signals sent by Euro-grandees. On the one hand, leaders are frightened about Ukraine breaking today’s systems of EU farm subsidies. On the other, they seem happy to extend solemn defence and security pledges to Ukraine: a far more significant commitment.
The key to the puzzle lies in views of war and its imminence. If Europe really does face an attack by Russia, nothing matters more than locking Ukraine in as a partner. Indeed, in off-the-record conversations with senior European and Ukrainian sources, the strongest arguments made for Ukrainian membership are all about security threats. In addition to bullish talk about accessing Ukrainian defence technologies, some arguments are distinctly bleak. When the war with Russia ends, it is noted, Ukraine will be home to hundreds of thousands of battle-hardened veterans. If spurned by the EU, there is no guarantee that powerful factions in Ukraine will not turn away from the West. Ukraine drifting into civil conflicts and fights over resources, or growing closer to Russia, are all cited as dangers.
Anchoring Ukraine in Europe, while that is still possible
Henry Kissinger saw this moment coming. Interviewed by The Economist in 2023, America’s former secretary of state said that Ukraine should join NATO, reversing his earlier views. Europe is saying something “madly dangerous”, he worried. It is calling Ukraine too risky to be in NATO while arming “the hell out of them”.
Alas, talk of dangers and risks repels those European leaders and voters who do not see war with Russia as inevitable. If appeasing Mr Putin is a temptation, then every argument about Ukraine’s political instability, or its anger if kept outside the EU, is a reason to keep it out of the club. Europe has every right to ask whether Ukraine is ready for EU membership. Ukraine’s fate may hinge on something simpler: whether Europeans are ready to fight. ■
논증 분석
유형: diagnosis
핵심 주장
Ukraine의 EU 가입은 위험 부담이 있지만, 유럽의 안보를 위해 Ukraine을 EU 밖에 두는 것이 훨씬 더 위험하다.
논리구조
- 전제: European Union 정상들은 Russia의 공격 위협을 말로는 심각하게 받아들이지만, Ukraine EU 가입 문제에서는 행동이 모순적이다. Viktor Orban의 퇴장 이후 다른 회원국들의 반대도 표면화되고 있다.
- 진단: Friedrich Merz 독일 총리 등 주요 EU 지도자들은 Ukraine이 전쟁 중인 데다 법치·반부패 기준을 충족하지 못한다는 이유로 신속한 가입을 반대하고 있으며, EU 농업(Common Agricultural Policy)에 대한 경쟁 우려도 존재한다.
- 논거: Ukraine의 80만 병력과 AI 기반 드론·반드론 기술은 Russia에 맞서는 유럽 방위의 핵심 자산이며, Finland 대통령 Alexander Stubb의 말처럼 ‘유럽이 Ukraine을 필요로 하는 정도가 Ukraine이 유럽을 필요로 하는 정도보다 크다’.
- 진단: Ukraine의 NATO 가입은 Donald Trump의 적대적 태도로 인해 사실상 사망 선고를 받았으며, EU 가입만이 Ukraine이 서방 민주주의 세계에 닻을 내릴 수 있는 유일한 경로로 남아 있다.
- 처방: France와 Germany는 EU 준회원 형태(관찰자 지위, Article 42.7 상호방위 조항 적용 등)를 통한 잠정적 편입을 추진하고 있으며, Cyprus 정상회의에서 이 방향이 폭넓게 지지받았다.
- 논거: 전쟁 종전 후 수십만 명의 전투 경험 병사들이 Ukraine에 남게 되는데, EU가 Ukraine을 외면할 경우 강력한 세력이 친서방 노선을 이탈하거나 Russia 쪽으로 기울 수 있다는 안보 논리가 가입 찬성의 가장 강력한 근거다.
- 논거: Henry Kissinger도 2023년 인터뷰에서 Ukraine을 NATO에 가입시켜야 한다고 주장하며, ‘너무 위험하다며 가입은 막으면서 무기는 끝없이 공급한다’는 유럽의 태도가 ‘미친 듯이 위험하다’고 경고했다.
- 반론: Russia와의 전쟁이 불가피하지 않다고 보는 유럽 지도자와 유권자들에게는 Ukraine의 정치적 불안정성과 EU 편입 시의 복잡성이 오히려 가입을 거부해야 할 이유로 작동할 수 있다.
결론
Ukraine의 EU 가입 여부는 결국 유럽인들이 실제로 싸울 준비가 되어 있느냐는 더 근본적인 질문에 달려 있으며, 안보 위협을 진지하게 받아들인다면 Ukraine을 유럽에 묶어두는 것 외에 다른 선택지는 없다.
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