The country will become a test case for reversing democratic decay
Photograph: AP
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V IKTOR ORBAN, Hungary’s corpulent prime minister, revelled in his role as the champion of the growing band of populist nationalists in Europe and beyond. Only days before a general election on April 12th, America’s vice-president, J.D. Vance, visited Hungary to proclaim that a vote for Mr Orban was a vote for Western civilisation.
Mr Orban’s crushing defeat in that election was a rebuke to the veep’s arrant nonsense. But it also means that the election’s triumphant—and solidly conservative—winner, Peter Magyar, will be seized on by centrists and progressives as a case study in how to reverse democratic decay.
One conclusion is that nothing turns the page like an overwhelming victory. After years of chipping away at Hungary’s independent institutions, Mr Orban could have aped Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil and Donald Trump of America by contesting a close result. In the event, with his Fidesz party on track to win just 40% of the votes and 56 seats, compared with 52% and 137 seats for Mr Magyar and Tisza, the Budapest bulldozer had the grace to concede promptly.
Mr Magyar will now command a two-thirds majority in the parliament, just as Fidesz did. That gives him the legal power to amend the constitution, unless the president risks voters’ anger by vetoing every amendment. During 16 years in charge, Mr Orban jammed Fidesz into every corner of the state. The party controls the supreme and constitutional courts. Its allies own most of the broadcast, online and print media. It has apparatchiks throughout the civil service, in state-owned companies and the education system.
A second conclusion is that voters are more susceptible to arguments about corruption and economic competence than to warnings about inchoate tyranny. On the campaign trail, Mr Magyar never tired of pointing out to Hungarians how Mr Orban and his cronies were making out like bandits. And that is precisely because they were bandits. Rigged public contracts, favours from regulators under Fidesz’s thumb and the diversion of European Union subsidies all fattened the wallets of those favoured by Mr Orban.
Voters want Mr Magyar to restore the rule of law, revive Hungary’s economy and eradicate corruption and the crooks who benefit from it. Because the Fidesz machine could yet hinder his ability to govern, Mr Magyar should be ruthless in dismantling its controls. He must also act quickly. Poland, which voted in a new government in 2023, has demonstrated how hard it can be to repair the damage caused by years of populist rule.
But Mr Magyar must also be magnanimous in the reconstruction that follows. Tisza did not win its victory alone. Nearly all the other opposition groups in Hungary—conservative, liberal and leftist—laid down their standards to unite behind Mr Magyar. They need to share in the new Hungary, too.
A third conclusion is that nobody likes foreign interference. That applies to Mr Vance, who warned of the malign intentions of bureaucrats from Brussels only to find that meddlers from MAGA are not wildly popular, either. But it also applies to Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, who has courted Hungary with cheap energy and special favours, and to China’s president, Xi Jinping, who has seen Hungary as a gateway to Europe. By rejecting Russian and American efforts to influence their votes, a majority showed that they want to belong in that least fashionable sphere of influence, the EU.
To Peter the spoils
The responsibility for putting all this right falls upon the new leader. Mr Magyar remains something of a mystery. He defected from Mr Orban’s camp only two years ago. As a campaigner, he was extraordinary, criss-crossing the country to hold rallies against Fidesz and unite a broad coalition behind Tisza.
In office, he deserves help. Now that Hungarians have elected a government bound to abide by the law, Europe should quickly unlock the billions of euros it has withheld from the country. That might seem like another form of foreign interference, but Hungary freely decided to become an EU member and to follow its rules. Mr Magyar has an awesome task ahead. Liberals everywhere will be rooting for him. ■
논증 분석
유형: diagnosis
핵심 주장
Peter Magyar의 압도적 승리는 민주주의 후퇴를 되돌리는 방법에 대한 중요한 사례 연구를 제공하며, Hungary는 포퓰리즘 집권 이후 민주주의 회복의 시험대가 될 것이다.
논리구조
- 전제: Viktor Orban은 유럽과 그 너머의 포퓰리즘 민족주의 운동의 챔피언을 자처했으며, J.D. Vance조차 선거 직전 Hungary를 방문해 Orban 지지를 서방 문명 수호와 동일시했다.
- 논거: 첫 번째 교훈: 압도적 승리만이 국면을 전환할 수 있다. Fidesz가 40%·56석에 그치고 Tisza가 52%·137석을 획득하는 결정적 패배 앞에서 Orban은 결과에 불복하지 않고 패배를 인정할 수밖에 없었다.
- 진단: Orban은 16년 집권 동안 대법원·헌법재판소, 방송·온라인·인쇄 미디어 대부분, 공무원 조직, 국영기업, 교육 시스템 전반에 Fidesz를 심어 놓았으며, Magyar는 이 기득권 구조를 해체해야 하는 과제를 안고 있다.
- 논거: 두 번째 교훈: 유권자들은 막연한 전제주의 경고보다 부패와 경제적 무능에 관한 논거에 더 민감하게 반응한다. Magyar가 Orban 측근들의 공공계약 조작, 규제기관 장악, EU 보조금 전용 등 구체적 부패 사례를 지속적으로 제기한 것이 주효했다.
- 처방: Magyar는 Fidesz 기계의 방해를 극복하기 위해 그 통제 구조를 단호하게 해체해야 하며, Poland의 사례가 보여주듯 포퓰리즘 집권 이후 피해 복구는 매우 어렵기 때문에 신속하게 행동해야 한다.
- 처방: 동시에 Magyar는 관용을 발휘해야 한다. Tisza의 승리는 보수·자유·좌파 야권 세력이 모두 연대한 결과이므로, 이들 모두가 새로운 Hungary를 함께 나눠야 한다.
- 논거: 세 번째 교훈: 외국의 내정 간섭은 누구도 좋아하지 않는다. Vance의 MAGA식 개입, Vladimir Putin의 저렴한 에너지 제공, Xi Jinping의 EU 관문 전략 모두 유권자의 반감을 샀으며, 다수 유권자는 EU 규범 안에 머물기를 선택했다.
- 반론: Magyar는 2년 전에야 Orban 진영에서 이탈한 정치적 신인으로 아직 실체가 불분명하다는 우려가 존재하나, 캠페인 과정에서 광범위한 연합을 구축한 역량은 입증되었다.
- 처방: EU는 법치를 준수하는 정부가 들어선 Hungary에 그동안 보류해온 수십억 유로를 신속히 지원해야 하며, 이는 외국의 간섭이 아니라 Hungary가 자유롭게 선택한 EU 규범 준수에 따른 정당한 지원이다.
결론
Peter Magyar의 승리는 민주주의 후퇴를 되돌릴 수 있다는 희망을 제시하지만, 성공 여부는 Fidesz 기구의 신속한 해체, 광범위한 연합의 포용, 그리고 EU의 지원이라는 세 가지 조건에 달려 있다.
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