That will be bad for America—and everyone else
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Illustration: The Economist/Getty Images
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F OR 12 years Nicolás Maduro terrorised Venezuela. He stole elections and, when people objected, his goons killed, raped or tortured them by suffocation with plastic bags. His comrades looted and mismanaged the economy so wantonly that GDP fell by 69%. A quarter of the population fled abroad. Both the economic collapse and the exodus have been worse than is typical during the bloodiest of civil wars.
Mr Maduro was also an international menace: colluding with drug gangs, threatening oil-rich Guyana and propping up Cuba’s communist tyranny with cheap fuel. He supported Hizbullah, helped Iran evade sanctions and gave Russia and China a foothold across the water from Florida. And then he was gone—snatched by US special forces on January 3rd.
This raid matters far beyond Venezuela. One reason is how it happened. It was a stunning display of hard power—and its limits. Another is why it happened. Rather than citing democracy or human rights, as American presidents once did, Donald Trump said he aimed to grab Venezuela’s oil and assert dominance over the western hemisphere. And a third is when it happened. Mr Trump is hastening the demise of the old order of UN resolutions, international law and universal values. The unfolding drama will help determine what takes its place.
First, consider the how. No other military force could have swooped in and seized a despot (and his wife) so surgically. It took less than three hours. Not a single American died, though a reported 32 Cuban spooks guarding the Maduros did. By January 5th the odious couple were in court in New York, facing drug charges and possibly life sentences. America’s adversaries have been warned.
Yet the story also illustrates the limits to military power. This was a raid, not an invasion. Scarred by failures in Afghanistan and Iraq, America is attempting, from afar, something much less than regime change. Mr Maduro is gone but his machinery of plunder and repression remains. His vice-president, Delcy Rodríguez, seems to have taken charge. The regime’s motorbike militias, the colectivos, are on the streets reasserting terror. With many gun-toting groups in Venezuela, an army with 2,400 generals and much paranoia at the top, a descent into conflict is also possible.
Mr Trump says he now “runs” Venezuela, by which he means that Ms Rodríguez has to do what he says—or else. Yet he will struggle to enforce his will. True, the US Navy still blocks the oil exports on which Venezuela depends. On January 7th American forces seized two tankers used to ship Venezuelan oil, one near Iceland and one in the Caribbean. But Mr Trump’s threats to station troops in Venezuela or to launch repeated raids, each months in the planning, are not credible.
The second lesson from Venezuela is the why. The snatching of Mr Maduro is a worked example of the “Donroe doctrine”—Mr Trump’s vision of how America should assert itself in its region. “American dominance in the western hemisphere will never be questioned again,” he crowed. “Won’t happen.”
The doctrine is about power and natural resources, not values. Venezuela’s most popular politician is a democrat: the Nobel-prizewinning María Corina Machado. Mr Trump dismissed her as lacking “support”. Yet she is so popular that Mr Maduro barred her from the presidential election he stole in 2024. Mr Trump means she does not control the army. He prefers to back the people with guns instead. They have no interest in fair elections, which would mean losing power and risking jail. Venezuelans still hope Mr Trump can broker a transition to democracy, but he shows little inclination to try.
His national-security strategy, published in late 2025, spoke of enlisting friends and expanding alliances in the Americas. It is now clear that this invitation comes at the barrel of a gun. Within hours of announcing Mr Maduro’s capture, Mr Trump had also threatened Colombia, Cuba, Greenland and Mexico.
He makes clear he craves natural resources—mostly for America. Mr Trump has laid claim to Venezuela’s underexploited oil reserves—the world’s largest—and says that the United States will receive 30m-50m barrels straight away. Venezuela’s oil industry has been so badly managed that, with American help, raising output by a little should be possible. Yet Mr Trump’s boast that he can rapidly and profitably restore production to previous levels is deluded. Demand is weak and the country is short of skills and capital. And oil companies are wary of taking costly, decades-long, multi-billion-dollar bets that Venezuela will be safe.
Third is what this means for the Americas and the world. Smaller countries close to the United States may feel they have no choice but to submit to Mr Trump’s bullying. Yet in the years to come, many leaders will seek to reclaim their sovereignty. And many countries will quietly seek closer ties with other powers, including China. Unless coercion is balanced by attraction, Mr Trump’s hemispheric doctrine will eventually fail and, in doing so, weaken the United States.
In stating so brazenly that might makes right, Mr Trump has already undermined America’s alliances. Greenland is a self-governing part of Denmark, which is a member of NATO. Seizing it would destroy the alliance. America’s Pacific allies will also conclude that to depend on Mr Trump is to be vulnerable to his predations.
By contrast, China and Russia are experts in navigating a world where the strong impose their will on the weak. Mr Trump may believe that each will stick to its own sphere of influence, but where do those spheres begin and end? As countries everywhere feel emboldened to encroach on their neighbours, the dismal prospect is of an aggressive, border-shifting 19th-century world, but armed with 21st-century weapons.
America was a successful superpower because its self-interest and realpolitik were turbocharged by an avowed faith in universal values of democracy and human rights. Mr Trump believes that, far from being a unique strength in foreign affairs, that was a foolish indulgence. His raid on Venezuela is likely to show how wrong he is. ■
논증 분석
유형: diagnosis
핵심 주장
Donald Trump의 ‘강자가 원하는 것을 취한다’는 세계관은 보편적 가치 대신 힘과 자원을 앞세우며, 이는 미국의 동맹을 약화시키고 장기적으로 미국 자신에게도 해가 될 것이다.
논리구조
- 전제: Nicolás Maduro는 12년간 Venezuela를 공포로 통치하며 선거를 도둑질하고, GDP를 69% 붕락시켰으며, 인구의 1/4을 해외로 내몰았고, 마약 조직·Iran·Russia·China와 결탁한 국제적 위협 세력이었다.
- 논거: 미국 특수부대의 Maduro 체포는 3시간 이내에 완료된 압도적인 하드파워 과시였으나, 이는 침공이 아닌 기습에 불과했고 Maduro의 억압 기구와 후계자 Delcy Rodríguez는 그대로 남아 미국의 군사력에는 분명한 한계가 있음을 보여준다.
- 진단: Trump의 이번 행동은 민주주의나 인권이 아닌 자원 확보와 반구 지배를 명분으로 삼은 ‘Donroe doctrine’의 실제 사례로, 세계 최대 원유 매장량을 보유한 Venezuela의 석유 이권 장악을 노골적으로 선언한 것이다.
- 논거: Trump는 민주주의 상징인 노벨평화상 수상자 María Corina Machado를 외면하고 군부 등 총을 쥔 세력 편을 들었으며, 이는 그의 전략이 가치가 아닌 힘의 논리에 기반함을 확인시켜 준다.
- 논거: Trump의 석유 생산 급속 회복 공언은 허황된 것으로, Venezuela 석유 산업은 기술·자본이 부족하고 수요도 약하며, 석유 기업들은 수십 년에 걸친 수십억 달러 투자를 감행할 의향이 없다.
- 진단: Trump가 Maduro 체포 직후 Colombia, Cuba, Greenland, Mexico를 동시에 위협한 것은 ‘동맹 확대’가 실상 총구를 앞세운 강압임을 드러내며, 약소국들은 복종하거나 China 등 다른 강대국과 은밀히 연대하는 방향으로 움직일 것이다.
- 반론: Greenland 강탈은 NATO 동맹국인 Denmark의 자치령을 침탈하는 것으로 NATO 해체로 이어질 수 있으며, 태평양 동맹국들도 Trump에 대한 의존이 오히려 자국을 취약하게 만든다고 판단하게 될 것이다.
- 진단: Trump가 ‘강자의 논리’를 노골화함으로써 China와 Russia 같은 현상 타파 세력이 자국 세력권 확장에 대담해지고, 국경 변경이 일상화된 19세기식 공격적 세계 질서가 21세기 무기와 결합되는 최악의 시나리오가 현실화될 수 있다.
결론
미국이 초강대국으로 성공할 수 있었던 것은 자국 이익과 민주주의·인권이라는 보편적 가치의 결합 덕분이었으며, Trump가 그것을 어리석은 낭비로 폐기하는 것은 결국 미국 자신의 힘을 갉아먹을 것임을 Venezuela 사례가 입증하고 있다.
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