How would American ground forces take Kharg?

Donald Trump says the war will end soon. But he is capable of feints

Photograph: US Navy photo

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K harg island is one of those patches of land that has had the misfortune to be a recurring backdrop to military history. Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan both considered invading it. Saddam Hussein bombed it. So has Donald Trump, who in 1988 said that were he president, he would “do a number” on the island. Although Mr Trump now says that the Iran war might end in a few weeks, and that he will give a televised address on the evening of April 1st with an “important” update on its progress, he has a history of feints and misdirections. And he has also said that he might “take” the island.

It is an export terminal for 90% of Iran’s oil, which is pumped in by pipeline. “If you grab Kharg, you basically have their oil export capability hostage,” says Seth Krummrich, a former chief of staff of us Special Operations Central, which deals with the Middle East. Mr Trump could use the island as a bargaining chip, potentially returning it in exchange for Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

America has already softened up the island’s defences, striking 90 military targets but sparing its oil facilities. Taking Kharg “is certainly within the capabilities” of the American armed forces, says Joseph Votel, a former commander of centcom, which runs Pentagon operations in the Middle East (now at the Middle East Institute, a think-tank). But seizing and holding the island would present its own risks.

The first challenge is getting boots on the island. In recent weeks, America has deployed various units that could be used in ground operations. The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (meu)—a group of around 2,500 marines, with the uss Tripoli, an amphibious assault ship, at its core—is in the Middle East, having been sent from Japan. The 11th meu will arrive in a couple of weeks from California. The Pentagon has ordered 2,000 elite paratroopers from the army’s 82nd Airborne Division to the region, possibly an advance for many more. Several hundred special-operations forces have also arrived in the Gulf.

Map: The Economist

Former military officials estimate that America would need at least a battalion of combat forces, roughly 1,000 troops, to take Kharg. With the Strait of Hormuz under fire, marines would struggle to get their ships and landing craft into place for an amphibious assault. An airborne assault, with planes ferrying soldiers and equipment to the island, would also be risky. Kharg has an airstrip, but Iran could bomb that. And since the airstrip is the obvious drop zone for paratroopers, Iranian forces would surely be waiting for them there.

Instead, soldiers would probably attack Kharg by helicopter. The 31st meu practised a similar assault in the Pacific last year. Nearly 400 marines were flown in helicopters for 1,600km from ship to shore—more than the distance they would cover from Oman to Kharg. The Pentagon would probably establish a nearby staging area where helicopters could be refuelled, boosting their rate of sorties. The assault helicopters would need surveillance aircraft, warplanes and attack helicopters as escorts. Upon approach, they could face fire from small arms as well as from portable air defences.

Getting those troops to Kharg is only the first step. They would then need to clear and hold it, under fire from Iran. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran’s elite paramilitary force, has reportedly scattered anti-personnel mines on the island and still has troops there. The marines could try to use helicopters to deploy short-range air-defence systems to the island. But, given their weight and the distances involved, landing ships might be required to move them.

That leaves soldiers vulnerable. One option is to rely on attack helicopters and fighter jets circling protectively overhead, striking Iranian missiles or drone teams. That could tie up large numbers of aircraft for an indefinite period. America also has air defences on ships but many are running low on interceptors. “The Iranians can saturate that island with whatever it is they have left,” says Kevin Donegan, a retired admiral who commanded the us Navy’s Fifth Fleet, which operates in the region.

American forces could blunt Iran’s aerial threat using Kharg’s oil infrastructure as cover. Ground forces could dig in around the pipelines, storage tanks and shipping terminals, goading Iran into hitting its own oil facilities. That would put the Iranian regime in the awkward position of having to decide whether it is “willing to destroy [its] own oil economy to kill some Americans”, suggests Mr Krummrich.

The problem is not just getting to the island and parrying projectiles. An expeditionary unit carries only two weeks of supplies; an airborne brigade much less. Initially, much of the resupply effort would probably rely on helicopters or other aircraft that can carry little. Planes could drop more supplies. But each time American forces sent in new equipment or other goods, they would need to re-establish complex aerial convoys similar to those that brought troops to land, says Mr Votel. That would not be easy, or cheap.

The broader question is whether holding Kharg would serve Mr Trump’s aim: to “take the oil”. Iran could shut off the pipelines to the island, perhaps diverting some to oil terminals down the coast, which can handle a quarter of Kharg’s volumes. If the oil continues to flow, Mr Trump would need to get it out via Hormuz. It would be far simpler to grab Iran’s oil exports—still more than 1.5m barrels a day, remarkably—from tankers at sea, much as Mr Trump did with Venezuela. That, though, would not have the drama of America’s largest airborne assault in nearly 40 years. ■

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논증 분석

유형: causal

핵심 주장

Donald Trump이 Kharg Island 점령 가능성을 시사하고 있으나, 실제 지상군 작전은 상륙·공수·보급·지속 점령 등 복합적 난제로 인해 전략적 실효성이 불확실하다.

논리구조

1. 전제: Kharg Island는 Iran 석유 수출의 90%를 담당하는 핵심 터미널로, 점령 시 Iran의 석유 수출 능력 전체를 인질로 삼을 수 있어 Donald Trump의 협상 카드가 될 수 있다.
2. 전제: Donald Trump은 종전이 임박했다고 말하면서도 섬을 ‘탈취’할 수 있다고 발언하는 등 양면적 신호를 보내고 있으며, 과거에도 페인트(feint)와 오도(misdirection)를 구사해 왔다.
3. 논거: 미국은 이미 섬 방어 시설 90개 군사 표적을 타격해 전력을 약화시켰으며, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, 11th MEU, 82nd Airborne Division 낙하산병 2,000명, 특수작전군 수백 명 등 지상작전 가능 전력을 걸프 지역에 집결시키고 있다.
4. 진단: 최소 1개 대대(약 1,000명)가 필요한 Kharg Island 점령에서, Strait of Hormuz 교전 상황으로 인해 상륙돌격함 접근이 어렵고, 공수 작전은 유일한 활주로에서 이란군의 매복 위험이 크기 때문에 헬리콥터 강습이 가장 현실적 방안이다.
5. 논거: 31st MEU는 지난해 태평양에서 함선에서 해안까지 1,600km 헬리콥터 강습 훈련을 실시했으며, 이는 오만에서 Kharg Island까지의 거리보다 긴 거리로 기술적 실행 가능성을 시사한다.
6. 진단: 상륙 이후에는 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps가 섬에 대인지뢰를 매설하고 병력을 배치한 상태에서 이란이 드론·미사일로 포화 공격할 수 있어, 방공 자산을 섬에 배치하거나 공중 엄호에 다수의 항공기를 장기 투입해야 하는 부담이 발생한다.
7. 논거: 미군이 석유 파이프라인·저장 탱크 주변에 진지를 구축하면 이란은 자국 석유 시설 파괴를 감수해야 하는 딜레마에 빠질 수 있어, 이를 인간 방패 대신 ‘인프라 방패’로 활용할 수 있다.
8. 진단: 원정 부대는 2주치 보급품만 휴대하며, 재보급은 복잡한 항공 수송 편대를 반복 구성해야 하므로 장기 점령은 막대한 비용과 위험을 수반한다.
9. 반론: Iran이 섬으로의 파이프라인을 차단하고 해안의 다른 터미널로 우회할 경우 점령의 실질적 효과가 반감되며, 호르무즈 해협을 통해 원유를 반출하는 것 자체도 난관이어서 ‘석유 탈취’라는 목표 달성이 불투명하다.
10. 반론: Venezuela 사례처럼 공해상에서 유조선을 나포하는 방식이 석유 수출을 차단하는 더 단순하고 효율적인 대안이며, 이는 40년 만의 최대 규모 공수작전이라는 ‘드라마’는 없지만 전략적으로 더 실용적이다.

결론

Kharg Island 점령은 기술적으로 가능하나, 초기 강습·방어 유지·보급·전략적 실효성 모든 단계에서 복합적 난제가 존재하며, 단순히 유조선을 나포하는 대안보다 실익이 불분명하다.

Editor’s note (April 1st 2026): This article has been updated to take in news of Mr Trump’s televised address.

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