Germany’s left-wing Die Linke party has won over the young

The populists promise a “scorching hot socialist summer” of protest

Photograph: Getty Images

Listen to this story

Your browser does not support the <audio> element.

“M ERZ…LECK…” yells Heidi Reichinnek, a young leader of Germany’s Die Linke (The Left) party. “ Eier!” her younger audience hollers back, erupting in giggles and cheers. Urging Friedrich Merz, the country’s chancellor, to “lick eggs” (ie, balls) is not the sort of thing expected of senior German politicians. But the lively patter of Ms Reichinnek, a social-media superstar with a tattoo of the communist heroine Rosa Luxemburg on her left arm, is one reason why the populist Die Linke is enjoying a moment. Sitting at around 11% in polls (see chart), it hopes to overtake the ailing Social Democrats (SPD), the junior coalition partner to Mr Merz’s Christian Democrats (CDU). “Speaking young people’s language isn’t easy,” says Antonia, a fan. “Heidi seems like she can relate to us.”

Chart: The Economist

Just 18 months ago Die Linke looked on the verge of extinction. An acrimonious split with Sahra Wagenknecht, a party star-turned-gadfly, had left it bruised and shorn of many MP s. In eastern Germany, once its heartland, its electorate was dying out or turning to the hard-right Alternative for Germany (A f D). Yet thanks to skilled organisation, a disciplined campaign focused on rent and redistribution and an unwise decision by Mr Merz to vote with the A f D on anti-immigration measures, Die Linke tripled its support in weeks, drew 9% of the vote in the general election in February 2025 and saw its membership more than double. Its success was the most surprising story of the campaign.

It also meant that “our electorate and our membership changed completely,” notes Janis Ehling, the party’s campaign mastermind. Die Linke has become more western, more female and much younger: it is the most popular party among Germans under 24. Ms Reichinnek’s potty-mouthed speech was delivered at “Unfollow Bundeswehr”, an event in Berlin organised to oppose the potential reintroduction of conscription. Many of her fans there were too young to vote.

The influx of members has turned Die Linke, formed in 2007 as a fusion of the old East German communists and an SPD splinter group, into a different party. The newcomers’ political education is “very online and very American”, says Loren Balhorn, a party member and editor of the German edition of Jacobin, a left-wing journal. There have been growing pains. Rows over Gaza have been especially brutal. Some older figures have quit over what they regard as a tilt to antisemitism.

The party’s fissures will be tested at its annual congress in Potsdam this weekend. Some arguments will be familiar: over whether MP s should cap their own salaries, for example. But with state elections looming, perhaps the toughest debate will be over whether the party sees itself as a protest outfit with a political wing, or should position itself as a power player.

This question has acquired fresh urgency in Germany’s east, where the strength of the A f D —shunned by every other party—has squeezed the space for viable coalitions. The CDU also excludes coalitions with Die Linke, but sometimes needs its votes to stay in office. This is hard to swallow for those in Die Linke who do not see it as their job to keep conservatives in power. But others believe nothing matters more than fighting the A f D, even as they seek to seduce its voters.

The A f D could win an outright majority in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt, which votes on September 6th. If not, Die Linke will probably be needed to elect a CDU premier. A brighter prospect beckons in Berlin, which votes two weeks later. There, the fragmented vote gives Die Linke a chance of forging a left-wing majority. Its signature policy in the capital—the expropriation of residential properties from corporate landlords—appeals to some in the Greens and the SPD, the parties with which it would seek to govern. Some corporations are deeply worried.

Everyone in Die Linke can agree on raging against heartless conservatives, and Mr Merz’s government is happy to oblige. It wants cuts to welfare and health care, and a bitter row over pensions looms once a state-appointed commission reports this month. Kathrin Gebel, an MP who sits on Die Linke’s board, promises “a scorching hot socialist summer” of protest. ■

---

논증 분석

유형: diagnosis

핵심 주장

한때 소멸 직전까지 몰렸던 Die Linke가 젊은 세대의 언어를 구사하는 지도력과 조직력을 바탕으로 부활에 성공했으나, 항의 운동 조직에 머물 것인지 실질적 권력을 추구할 것인지의 정체성 갈등이라는 새로운 과제에 직면해 있다.

논리구조

1. 전제: 18개월 전 Die Linke는 Sahra Wagenknecht와의 분열로 의석을 잃고 동독 지지 기반이 Alternative for Germany로 이탈하면서 소멸 직전 상태였다.
2. 논거: 치밀한 조직력, 임대료·재분배에 집중한 선거 캠페인, Friedrich Merz의 반이민 투표가 Alternative for Germany와 겹친다는 약점을 파고들어 지지율을 수주 만에 3배로 끌어올리고 2025년 2월 총선에서 9%를 획득했다.
3. 논거: Heidi Reichinnek의 소셜미디어 스타덤과 거친 언어 구사가 젊은 유권자와의 정서적 연결을 만들어내어 Die Linke를 24세 미만 독일인 사이 가장 인기 있는 정당으로 만들었다.
4. 진단: 대규모 신규 당원 유입으로 Die Linke는 더 서독적이고, 더 여성적이며, 훨씬 젊어지는 구조적 변화를 겪었으며, 신규 당원들의 정치적 성향은 ‘매우 온라인 중심적·미국적’이다.
5. 진단: 당내에서는 가자 문제 등을 둘러싼 갈등이 심화되고 일부 원로 당원이 반유대주의로의 경도를 이유로 탈당하는 등 성장통이 나타나고 있다.
6. 논거: 동독에서 Alternative for Germany의 강세가 연립정부 구성 공간을 압박하면서 Die Linke는 CDU 정권 유지에 협력할지, 순수 저항 운동으로 남을지의 딜레마에 처해 있다.
7. 반론: Saxony-Anhalt 주의회 선거에서는 Alternative for Germany 과반 저지를 위해 CDU 총리 선출에 Die Linke 표가 필요할 수 있어, 반보수 정체성과 현실 정치 사이의 모순이 드러난다.
8. 논거: Berlin 주의회 선거에서는 기업 임대인 주택 수용이라는 핵심 공약이 Greens·SPD와의 좌파 다수 연정을 가능하게 할 수 있어 실질적 권력 획득의 기회가 열려 있다.

결론

Die Linke는 젊은층 지지를 발판으로 원내 11% 지지율을 기록하며 부활했지만, 항의 운동 정당으로 남을지 집권 파트너로 나설지의 정체성 논쟁을 해결하는 것이 향후 생존과 성장의 핵심 과제다.

To stay on top of the biggest European stories, sign up to Café Europa, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter.

Explore more

→See the latest from topics you follow