Patients benefit from faster, cheaper treatments, wherever they are invented
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S omeone whose life is saved by a new medicine is unlikely to care whether it was invented at home or on the other side of the world. Yet America’s policymakers have begun treating China’s biotechnology industry as the next front in the tech war. A bill before Congress would amend the COINS Act, which restricts American investment in sensitive technologies abroad, to include licensing Chinese biotech. Some want the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), America’s drug regulator, to disregard clinical-trial data from China.
America’s worries have been brought about by a remarkable shift in where innovation happens. Chinese firms ran nearly a third of the world’s clinical trials last year, up from just 6% a decade earlier. China is now the world’s second-largest source of new drugs, behind only America itself. In 2025 nearly half of licensing deals worth $50m or more were struck with Chinese firms, up from none in 2020. In some categories, such as antibody-drug conjugates, a promising class of cancer treatments, Chinese firms accounted for almost all the licensing.
To view Chinese medical innovation as anything other than good news would be a mistake. In AI and semiconductors, America worries about its intellectual property leaking to China. In biotechnology the flow of information runs in the opposite direction. And though anxiety about China’s dominance in the physical supply chain for drugs is understandable—the country accounts for over 70% of the active pharmaceutical ingredients for essential drugs—manufacturing resilience and scientific collaboration are different issues. America cannot lose from gaining new knowledge.
Setting aside Chinese advances would be especially foolish, given that drug development suffers from poor productivity. Bringing a new medicine to market now costs roughly $2.8bn and can take well over a decade. Policymakers often complain about the rising cost of medicines. Yet proposals such as disregarding Chinese clinical-trial data would lengthen development timelines, raise costs and make drug discovery less productive. Does Congress really want pioneering treatments to be available in Europe or Asia before they reach Americans?
Some politicians fear that if drug firms spend their research budgets licensing Chinese molecules, less capital will be available for American biotechnology. But investment is not a lump to be divvied up. As the AI boom shows, when opportunities grow, so capital flows in. What matters is to make sure that American biotech is not hindered by bad policies. Fortunately, American firms remain the world’s leaders in drug discovery. They possess deep expertise in taking promising molecules through late-stage clinical trials, regulatory review and commercial launch. Chinese biotechnology executives privately acknowledge the FDA as the global regulatory leader.
America’s recent choices are blunting its edge. The FDA has suffered high turnover among senior officials, including the resignation of Marty Makary, its head. Decision-making has been politicised: firms can receive “priority vouchers” that speed up reviews in return for lowering their prices and investing in domestic manufacturing. Funding for the National Institutes of Health, the largest funder of biomedical research in the world, has been slashed. Research programmes have been cancelled for ideological reasons. At the same time, immigration policies are making America a less attractive destination for the scientists on whom the industry depends, including many talented researchers from China.
Take the red pill
America should fix those problems rather than locking out Chinese innovation. The best world for patients is one in which both China and America develop cheap and effective drugs. Diseases cross borders. So should their cures. ■
논증 분석
유형: prescription
핵심 주장
미국은 중국 바이오테크를 규제하는 대신 자국의 내부 문제를 해결해야 하며, 중국의 의료 혁신은 환자와 글로벌 의약품 개발 모두에 이익이 된다.
논리구조
- 전제: 미국 의회는 COINS Act를 개정해 중국 바이오테크 라이선싱을 제한하고, Food and Drug Administration이 중국산 임상시험 데이터를 무시하도록 하는 법안을 추진하고 있다.
- 진단: 중국 기업들은 지난해 전 세계 임상시험의 약 3분의 1을 수행했으며, 미국에 이어 세계 2위의 신약 공급원이 되었고, 2025년 5000만 달러 이상 라이선싱 계약의 절반가량이 중국 기업과 체결되었다.
- 논거: AI·반도체와 달리 바이오테크 분야에서는 정보의 흐름이 중국에서 미국으로 향하므로, 중국의 의료 혁신을 차단하는 것은 미국에 아무런 이득이 없다.
- 논거: 신약 개발은 약 28억 달러의 비용과 10년 이상의 기간이 소요될 만큼 생산성이 낮은데, 중국 임상시험 데이터를 배제하면 개발 기간이 늘어나고 비용이 상승해 혁신적 치료제가 미국보다 유럽·아시아에서 먼저 출시될 수 있다.
- 반론: 일부 정치인들은 중국 분자 라이선싱에 연구 예산이 쓰이면 미국 바이오테크에 투자할 자본이 줄어든다고 우려하지만, AI 붐이 보여주듯 투자는 고정된 파이가 아니며 기회가 커질수록 자본도 따라온다.
- 진단: 미국은 Marty Makary 등 FDA 고위 관료의 잇따른 사임, National Institutes of Health 예산 삭감, 이념적 이유로 한 연구 프로그램 취소, 과학자 유치를 어렵게 하는 이민 정책 등 자국 바이오테크 경쟁력을 스스로 약화시키고 있다.
- 처방: 미국은 중국 혁신을 차단하는 대신 FDA 역량 강화, National Institutes of Health 지원 확대, 우수 과학자 유치 등 내부 문제를 해결해야 한다.
결론
질병은 국경을 넘으므로 그 치료법도 그래야 하며, 중국과 미국 모두가 저렴하고 효과적인 신약을 개발하는 세계가 환자에게 최선이다.
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