But the American president is misinterpreting an incomplete success
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B efore its strongman leader, Nicolás Maduro, was captured by American special forces on January 3rd, Venezuela was a grim, hopeless place. His regime silenced critics and stole elections. Some opposition politicians were killed, tortured or thrown into jail. The economy had collapsed; 8m people had fled. The notion of Venezuela spontaneously becoming more open or prosperous seemed too much to hope for.
But in the 100 days since Mr Maduro’s seizure, Venezuela has changed for the better. Opposition politicians, many only just released from prison, are meeting openly. Protests are no longer routinely suppressed. Investors are sniffing around oil, gas and mining assets. Delcy Rodríguez, previously Mr Maduro’s deputy, is running the country to Donald Trump’s liking, albeit under the threat of violence if she fails to comply.
None of this would have happened without Mr Trump. But the president is muddled about what Venezuela shows, in two important ways. The first is that he talks about the country’s transformation as though it were complete, speaking of how “Venezuela has worked out so incredibly”. The second is that he holds Venezuela up as a model for regime change. “What we did in Venezuela”, Mr Trump said in March, when asked about his plans for Iran, “I think is the perfect, the perfect scenario.” On both counts he is wrong.
For one thing, Venezuela’s positive transformation is only limited so far. It will not be secure until democracy has been rekindled. Foreign investment will not pour in at the scale needed while the rule of law is backed only by Mr Trump’s word that he will keep the regime’s cronies in line. What’s more, having had their hopes dramatically raised, Venezuelans will bridle without more progress away from dictatorship. Those jails still hold some 480 political prisoners. Investors want stability; delaying elections will eventually cause unrest.
The return of democracy is a possibility. However, the path towards it is narrow and murky and, without sustained American pressure, it may vanish altogether. It probably requires María Corina Machado, leader of the opposition, to return to Venezuela and campaign for elections. After she was barred from standing in the presidential vote in 2024, Venezuelans voted overwhelmingly for her political ally, Edmundo González; Mr Maduro pretended he had won. This time, Venezuelans may have to take to the streets at the same time as seeking negotiations with those in power.
The threat of his big foreign-policy success being marred by protesters angrily demanding change may motivate Mr Trump to press for elections. Marco Rubio, his Cuban-American secretary of state, also has staked much on Venezuela’s success, including his own presidential ambitions. But the long game is hardly a Trumpian strength. Besides, Ms Rodríguez will surely seek to string things out, hoping that Mr Trump will lose interest. The temptation for America to trade democratic delay for short-term stability will be strong.
Even if Mr Trump and his officials can nurture a democratic Venezuela, his methods are not easily reproduced elsewhere. The Venezuelan regime was uniquely vulnerable to Mr Trump’s transactional approach, because it has long been corrupt and ideology-free. Mr Maduro was no more than the gangster-in-chief. By removing him, Mr Trump helped others profit more. With few shared beliefs beyond grabbing power and money, it cost them little to fall in line with America. Venezuela’s history of democracy and its robust political opposition also aided Mr Trump, by giving Venezuelans a group apart from the regime to rally around. Most interpreted Mr Maduro’s seizure narrowly, as an attack on a hated dictator.
Contrast this with Mr Trump’s failed attempts to topple the regime in Iran. The strike at the start of the war that killed Ali Khamenei, the country’s supreme leader, prompted the rest of the regime in Tehran to close ranks and fight back. However corrupt and self-serving the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps may be, a shared ideology helps prevent the regime from fracturing. By contrast, Ms Rodríguez’s deal with America was consistent with the self-serving values of Mr Maduro.
The mullahs and the moolah
Iran’s regime is far more powerful than the one in Venezuela. But even tiny Cuba has so far held out against Mr Trump’s aggression. For 66 years the island has been run by the Castro family, who are true believers in communism regardless of the country’s corruption. Neither the regime in Cuba nor that in Iran faces an organised domestic political opposition.
Mr Trump sees ideology as weakness. He thinks making money is all that really counts. If he keeps following the model he stumbled into in Venezuela, reality will prove him wrong. ■
논증 분석
유형: diagnosis
핵심 주장
Donald Trump의 Venezuela 정책은 제한적 성과를 거뒀으나, 그는 그 성공을 과대평가하고 이를 다른 국가에 적용 가능한 보편 모델로 오해하고 있다.
논리구조
- 전제: Nicolás Maduro 체포(2026년 1월 3일) 이후 Venezuela에는 실질적 변화가 나타났다: 야당 정치인 석방, 시위 억압 완화, 투자자들의 에너지·광업 자산 관심 증가.
- 논거: Donald Trump는 두 가지 점에서 오류를 범하고 있다. 첫째, Venezuela의 변혁이 완성된 것처럼 말하며(‘Venezuela has worked out so incredibly’), 둘째, 이를 Iran 등 다른 국가에 적용 가능한 ‘완벽한 시나리오’라고 주장한다.
- 진단: Venezuela의 긍정적 변화는 아직 불완전하다. 약 480명의 정치범이 여전히 수감 중이고, 법치는 Trump의 약속에만 의존하며, 민주주의 회복 없이는 외국인 투자 유입도 불안정하다.
- 처방: 민주주의 회복을 위해서는 미국의 지속적 압력, María Corina Machado의 귀국 및 선거 운동, 그리고 국민의 거리 시위와 협상 병행이 필요하다.
- 반론: Trump가 민주적 선거를 압박할 유인은 존재하나(Marco Rubio의 정치적 이해관계 포함), 장기 전략은 Trump의 강점이 아니며 Delcy Rodríguez는 시간을 끌며 미국의 관심이 식기를 노릴 것이다.
- 진단: Venezuela 모델이 다른 국가에 적용되기 어려운 이유: Venezuela 정권은 이념 없이 부패한 갱단식 구조여서 Maduro 제거 후 나머지 세력이 미국과 협력하기 쉬웠고, 민주주의 역사와 강력한 야당이 존재했다.
- 반론: 반면 Iran은 Ali Khamenei 제거 후 정권이 결집해 반격했으며, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps는 공유 이념으로 결속되어 있어 분열되지 않았다. 작은 Cuba조차 공산주의 이념으로 무장한 Castro 가문 체제가 66년간 버텨왔고 조직된 국내 야당도 없다.
- 결론: Trump는 이념을 약점으로 보고 돈이 전부라고 믿지만, 이념으로 결속된 정권에 Venezuela 모델을 적용하면 현실이 그를 틀렸음을 증명할 것이다.
결론
Venezuela에서의 제한적 성공은 그 정권의 고유한 취약성 덕분이며, 이를 보편적 정권교체 모델로 삼으려는 Trump의 시도는 이념적으로 결속된 Iran이나 Cuba 같은 정권에는 통하지 않을 것이다.
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