A quarter of all the world’s known deposits of rare earths are found in the country
Photograph: AP
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A PINK WAREHOUSE in Brazil’s north-east may help the world out of a tight geopolitical bind. Hidden inside a research park in the state of Bahia, the facility is run by Brazilian Rare Earths (BRE), a mining firm. It is building one of Latin America’s first separation plants for the eponymous minerals, a cluster of 17 elements needed for manufacturing everything from missiles to microwaves. Western countries anxiously await new supply, eager to reduce reliance on China, which controls 70% of mining and 90% of processing.
Donald Trump is particularly keen. The United States was hard hit last year when China imposed a series of export restrictions on metals, machine parts and engineers. By the time a one-year truce was declared in November many American and European factories had been forced to curb operations. Automobile, green-tech and arms manufacturers were particularly affected by a shortage of supermagnets. Few trust the truce will hold. Corporations are racing to find alternative suppliers, says Bernardo da Veiga, BRE ’s boss.
Chart: The Economist
Brazil holds nearly a quarter of the world’s known deposits of rare earths, second only to China (see chart). Besides prime geology, the country boasts a sturdy extractive industry. Cheap electricity, experience in mineral exports and veteran engineers are big advantages, says José Augusto Palma of Aclara Resources, a Chilean miner. Brazil has been there before. In the 1950s a Brazilian company, Orquima, was the world’s largest miner of rare earths, extracting metals from monazite sands. China came to dominate the industry after concerns about monazite’s radioactivity led Brazil to dramatically tighten regulation and nationalise Orquima.
Modern Brazil wants to reclaim this mantle. In January the government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (known as Lula) began preparing a national strategy for rare earths. That followed a decree in November that made acquiring them a national-security issue, unlocking special financing, public-procurement options and simplified import procedures.
Politicians have two motivations. The first is to spur innovation. Rare earths’ global market is worth a few billion dollars a year—a couple of months of Brazil’s iron exports—so the revenue up for grabs is paltry. The real value is as a feedstock for high-tech manufacturing, says André Pimenta of CIT Senai ITR, a rare-earth-magnet manufacturer in the state of Minas Gerais, the first of its kind in South America.
The second draw is diplomatic. Most major economies are facing deficits of critical minerals, from humdrum copper and nickel to esoteric scandium and yttrium. The United States is the most enthusiastic. In July Donald Trump slapped 50% tariffs on most imports from Brazil in an effort to influence the trial of Jair Bolsonaro, a former president, for plotting a coup. Yet that same month the American ambassador to Brazil privately met mining companies to express an interest in buying their future output. After initially declaring Brazil’s minerals were not for sale, Lula has dangled the possibility of a rare-earths accord in exchange for a reduction in tariffs. If the United States is not interested, the EU, Japan or South Korea may well be.
There are challenges ahead. Brazil has one functional mine, opened in 2024 by a private outfit named Serra Verde. The company plans to double the amount of non-Chinese supply of more valuable, “heavy” rare earths in the market, yet has experienced production problems. Its ionic clay deposits have been trickier to work with. A nearly $500m loan from an American aid agency should smooth the process. Yet dozens of other miners are still waiting for licences. None will start producing until 2028 at the earliest. Few are keen to do the processing in Brazil.
More worrying is Lula’s protectionist bent. “Either we take advantage of these riches that God has given us and make them a wealth for our people, or we will see the same old countries digging holes in our country, taking our minerals,” he said in a recent speech. This is the wrong attitude, says Julio Nery of Ibram, Brazil’s mining association. Moving up the value chain is important for Brazil, which still imports Chinese steel made from Brazilian iron. But rare earths have limited prospects.
Most miners are foreign-owned because the business is more capital-intensive than Brazilian markets can easily sustain, says Rafael Moreno of Viridis, an Australian miner. That is a big reason why most miners decline to process iron ore into oxide in Brazil, as well as lack of expertise. With time and money, these problems can be fixed. And money is coming.
For those about to rock
China long used predatory pricing to deter competition, recouping losses through magnet and electric-vehicle sales. Mr Trump challenged that in July when he signed an agreement with California-based MP Materials. The deal guarantees them a floor price of $110 per kilogram for neodymium-praseodymium oxide, roughly double China’s rate. Such price differences will become the norm, attracting new players into the market, says John Prineas of St George Mining, another Australian firm. Many of them will fall in the inevitable consolidation. The country that hosts the resources has hit pay dirt. ■
논증 분석
유형: causal
핵심 주장
China의 희토류 수출 제한으로 서방이 공급망 다변화를 절박하게 추구하는 가운데, 세계 2위의 희토류 매장량을 보유한 Brazil이 지정학적 수혜국으로 부상하고 있다.
논리구조
- 전제: China는 전 세계 희토류 채굴의 70%, 가공의 90%를 장악하고 있으며, 2025년 수출 제한 조치로 미국·유럽 공장들이 조업을 축소하고 슈퍼마그넷 부족이 심화되었다.
- 논거: Brazil은 세계 희토류 매장량의 약 4분의 1을 보유해 China 다음으로 많으며, 저렴한 전기, 광물 수출 경험, 숙련 엔지니어 등 채굴 인프라도 갖추고 있다.
- 논거: Brazil 정부(Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 대통령)는 2025년 11월 희토류를 국가안보 사안으로 지정하는 칙령을 발표하고, 2026년 1월 국가 전략 수립에 착수하며 특별 금융·조달 지원을 가동했다.
- 논거: 외교적 레버리지도 확보되었다. Donald Trump가 Jair Bolsonaro 재판 관련 50% 관세를 부과했음에도 미국 대사가 브라질 광산기업들과 협의했고, Lula는 희토류 협정과 관세 인하를 맞교환 카드로 활용하고 있다.
- 진단: 그러나 현재 가동 중인 광산은 Serra Verde 1곳뿐이고 다른 광산들은 2028년 이전 생산 불가능하며, 이온 점토 채굴의 기술적 난제와 가공 시설 부재, 면허 지연 등 공급망 구축에 상당한 시간이 필요하다.
- 반론: Lula의 보호주의적 성향—‘자원 국가주의’—은 외국 자본 유치를 저해할 수 있다. 희토류 사업은 자본집약적이어서 브라질 내 가공 의무화는 투자 기피를 초래할 위험이 있다.
- 논거: Donald Trump가 MP Materials와 체결한 네오디뮴-프라세오디뮴 산화물 최저가격($110/kg, 중국의 약 2배) 보장 협정은 China의 약탈적 가격 전략을 무력화하고 새로운 시장 참여자들을 유인하는 구조적 변화를 만들어내고 있다.
결론
China발 공급 충격과 서방의 탈중국 수요, 가격 보장 메커니즘이 맞물리면서 Brazil은 희토류 지정학의 핵심 수혜국으로 자리잡을 잠재력을 갖추고 있으나, 보호주의 정책과 인프라 미비를 극복해야 그 기회를 현실화할 수 있다.
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