John Healey calls out a government that lacks seriousness when it comes to the country’s security
Photograph: Getty Images
Listen to this story
AI Narrated
Your browser does not support the <audio> element.
T HE RESIGNATION of Britain’s defence secretary, John Healey, on June 11th had a feeling of the inevitable about it. It is another blow to the waning authority of Sir Keir Starmer. It is also deeply embarrassing for the prime minister, who frequently speaks about the growing threats that Britain and Europe face, as he prepares to meet NATO allies at a summit in Ankara on July 7th.
In his resignation letter Mr Healey, who has been locked in a battle with the Treasury since January, when the work on a spending plan to fund the government’s own strategic defence review (SDR) was completed, tells Sir Keir: “You have been unable, and the Treasury has been unwilling, to commit the resources that the nation needs to defend the country at this time of rising threats.” He goes on: “I am being forced to make decisions that would reduce the readiness of our forces and increase the risk to personnel on operations, and could make the country less safe.”
The defence investment plan (DIP) has been the subject of months of wrangling over how much money the armed forces would get and how it would be paid for. The delay in its publication had become a running joke, albeit one with serious consequences. It has dismayed allies and hampered industry from making necessary investments in capacity, while inflation will have raised the price of contracts. The need to publish the DIP before the NATO summit has brought matters to a head.
Photograph: Getty Images
Although the government committed itself a year ago to providing the resources required to implement the main recommendations of the SDR, it had been apparent for some months that there would be backsliding. Service chiefs, who had warned of a funding gap of at least £28bn ($37bn) over the next four years before new capabilities were added, let alone the ten-year period covered by the DIP, were told to think again.
The expectation had been that the headline figure for extra spending related to the DIP over the next four years would be around £18bn—a compromise number that the national security adviser, Jonathan Powell, had reportedly told the prime minister was the bare minimum. That would have been in line with the established modus operandi of Sir Keir’s government, in that it would succeed in pleasing almost nobody (other departments were told to help out by shaving their capital budgets) but might have been enough for Mr Healey to have remained in post.
Chart: The Economist
However, on June 8th Mr Healey, by his own account, was presented with a financial settlement that fell “well short of what is required for defence and the country at this dangerous time”. Sources say that the amount was £13.5bn over four years, though some suspect that even that is inflated by what they see as Treasury trickery. Worse still, Mr Healey points out that the settlement is also “backloaded” and that Britain will be spending only 2.68% of GDP on defence by 2030, an increase of just 0.08 percentage points compared with next year’s planned level. The government’s pledge to get to 3% in the next parliament (albeit when “economic and fiscal conditions allow”) and to meet the NATO target of 3.5% by 2035 looks threadbare. Other NATO allies have been moving faster towards the target (see chart 1).
A £13.5bn settlement, if that is indeed what the DIP comes up with, will do little to increase the effectiveness of Britain’s shrunken armed forces (see chart 2) but will accelerate what analysts describe as the “hollowing out” of recent years. In practice, it will mean cuts to any programmes not deemed “untouchable” or for which firm contracts have not yet been signed. Above all, it is the modernisation of Britain’s nuclear deterrent, now known as the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE) and which encompasses the AUKUS submarine pact with America and Australia, that is sacrosanct. The requirement is for four new Dreadnought ballistic-missile submarines, a new British-designed nuclear warhead for the Trident D 5, and 12 new nuclear-powered attack submarines built through the AUKUS partnership. The DNE ’s share of the entire defence budget is expected to rise to as much as 25% in the coming years and it will be at least half of the equipment budget.
Chart: The Economist
It also seems certain that the Global Combat Air Programme to develop a sixth-generation fighter in partnership with Japan and Italy will go ahead. The Japanese, who are determined to see the aircraft enter service by 2035, have fretted about the British dragging their feet on coming up with the £6bn needed for the partners to sign long-term contracts. Japan’s prime minister, Takaichi Sanae, is visiting London this weekend on her way to the G 7 summit in France. The Japanese have made it clear that the London leg would be called off unless Britain coughed up.
But none of these big-ticket programmes will produce any capabilities until 2035 at the earliest, while their peak years of deployment will not be until the 2040s. By contrast, Britain’s big European allies are investing on the basis of what they see as a growing threat from Russia by 2030; Sir Keir himself has spoken of the risk of “an attack by Russia on NATO as soon as 2030”. The SDR had also warned of “a new era of threat” and called for Britain to prioritise being ready for high-intensity warfare by 2030.
Unless something changes as a result of Mr Healey’s resignation, the government appears willing to see the continued erosion of Britain’s conventional capabilities. The RAF will almost certainly have to reduce its orders for F -35B jet-fighters. The plan to buy 12 nuclear-capable F -35As may be dropped altogether, while older Typhoons will be withdrawn from service sooner than previously planned. The navy’s programme to replace its 30-year-old Type 23 frigates with eight new Type 26 and five Type 31 frigates will face further delays. The army’s “land mobility” programme and the renewal of its armoured fleet will be a tempting target for cuts. Promises to invest in sufficient munitions to sustain modern warfare can be fudged.
Mr Healey’s decision to quit and speak out may yet produce something positive. Ed Arnold of RUSI, a defence think-tank in London, describes it as “a seismic moment for the government and the Ministry of Defence…it is a very rare case of a senior minister taking a principled stand against the hollowing out of the UK armed forces rather than complaining about it with hindsight when out of office.” It may also prove the death knell for Sir Keir’s hapless premiership. ■
논증 분석
유형: diagnosis
핵심 주장
John Healey의 사임은 Keir Starmer 정부가 증가하는 안보 위협에도 불구하고 국방에 필요한 자원을 진지하게 투입할 의지가 없음을 폭로한다.
논리구조
- 전제: John Healey는 [Strategic Defence Review|전략방위검토] 이행을 위한 재원 확보를 놓고 1월부터 Treasury와 충돌해왔으며, [Defence Investment Plan|국방투자계획] 발표가 수개월째 지연되어 동맹국을 실망시키고 방산업계 투자를 저해했다.
- 진단: 국가안보보좌관 Jonathan Powell이 최소한의 마지노선으로 제시했다고 알려진 £180억에도 못 미치는 £135억(4년간)이라는 재정 합의안이 제시되었으며, 이마저도 후반부에 집중 배치(backloaded)되어 2030년까지 GDP 대비 국방비 비율은 고작 2.68%에 불과하다.
- 진단: [Defence Nuclear Enterprise]와 AUKUS 잠수함 사업, Global Combat Air Programme 등 대형 사업은 성역으로 보호되지만, 이 사업들이 실질 전력을 제공하는 시기는 2035년 이후로, Keir Starmer 본인이 경고한 ‘2030년까지의 러시아 위협’에는 전혀 대응하지 못한다.
- 논거: £135억 합의는 영국 군의 재래식 전력 공동화를 가속화할 것이며, F-35B 주문 축소, F-35A 계획 전면 취소, Typhoon 조기 퇴역, Type 26·31 호위함 프로그램 추가 지연, 육군 기갑 전력 현대화 삭감 등 구체적인 역량 감소로 이어질 것이다.
- 논거: 독일·프랑스 등 유럽 주요 동맹국들은 2030년 러시아 위협에 대비해 빠르게 NATO 목표치에 근접하고 있는 반면, 영국의 3%(차기 의회) 및 3.5%(2035년) 목표 공약은 공허해 보인다.
- 반론: RUSI의 Ed Arnold는 John Healey의 사임을 ‘원칙에 입각한 드문 결단’으로 평가하며, 이것이 정부를 압박해 긍정적 변화를 이끌어낼 가능성을 제시한다.
- 결론: John Healey의 사임은 Keir Starmer 정부의 국방에 대한 결여된 진지함을 상징적으로 드러내며, Keir Starmer의 총리직 자체를 위협하는 결정타가 될 수 있다.
결론
John Healey의 사임은 영국 정부가 말로만 안보를 외치면서 실제 재원 투입을 거부하는 모순을 만천하에 드러냈으며, 이는 Keir Starmer 총리의 권위를 치명적으로 약화시킬 수 있다.
For more expert analysis of the biggest stories in Britain, sign up to Blighty, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter.
Explore more
→See the latest from topics you follow
A photomontage of the Union Jack made of a microchip and a circuit board.
What Britain needs to do to grasp its big opportunities in AI
For a start, the government needs to think bigger
Andy Burnham delivers a speech on apprenticeships in Makerfield.
Golfers play at Nigg Bay Golf Club, overlooking the Port of Aberdeen and the Aberdeen Bay Wind Farm in Aberdeen, UK
The Tories hope a Scottish by-election will mark a turning-point
But Aberdeen is not exactly typical of Britain
Reform UK reform’s English punctuation
In a Reform candidate’s novel, both Nazis and English grammar are pummelled